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Abstract 
 
 
Informal economy involving unrecorded, unregistered, extra legal activities employs majority of 
the workforce in the developing world. Such extra legal existence of informal manufacturing and 
service sectors is facilitated through extortion by agents of political forces in power. Such 
extortion activities themselves constitute an informal segment. We develop a general equilibrium 
model to explore the possible    consequences of a change in the degree of extortion, change in 
the quality of administration, tariff reform etc. Economic reform of various kinds has interesting 
effects on the size of the extortion sector. Various reformatory policies may actually lead to an 
expansion of the informal sector.  
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1. Introduction 
Informal sector is an important ingredient of the contemporary world economy particularly in 
the developing regions as this segment occupies a formidable chunk of the unskilled labor force.  
Informal sector is extra-legal if not illegal as it generally does not conform to government 
regulations. These units do not abide by labor regulations of the government, and do not pay 
taxes. In fact a large part of it would have vanished if they had to confront government 
regulations. To suit our purpose we shall define the informal sector as the one which does not 
have to pay the minimum wage. Several papers have used this interpretation of the informal 
sector such as Agenor and Montiel (1997), Carruth and Oswald (1981), Marjit (2003), Marjit and 
Kar (2009, 2009a), Marjit, Kar and Beladi (2007), Kar and Marjit (2001), Beladi and Chao 
(1993), Beladi and Yabuuchi (2001), Chaudhuri (2003), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2010) 
etc. The survival of the informal segment requires negotiation with administration as this part of 
the economy is illegal by structure. Sometimes this negotiation is done by politically supported 
intermediaries, the “extortionists”.  
These extortionists take care of legal troubles and other hurdles for the informal producers. 
They keep the police at bay by paying bribes which in turn are extracted from the informal 
entrepreneurs, labor, capitalists etc. There is a substantial literature on extortion and mafia 
related activities such as Skaperdas (1992, 2001), Konard and Skaperdas (1998) etc. Our work is 
substantially different from that literature. 
First, we consider extortion as a facilitating device for organizing production in the informal 
sector. It is not pure extortion involving all segments of the society. 
Second, more significantly, we consider mobility of labor between extortion sector and 
informal production sector as well. Thus extortionists also have the option to work in the 
informal sector. Such mobility is then embedded in a general equilibrium structure where capital 
mobility also plays an important role. 
The story of the paper runs as follows. Let us assume that there are three goods out of which 
two are produced in the formal sector and the rest is produced in the so-called informal sector. 
All goods are different and only formal goods are traded. Informal good is non-traded. One 
commodity in the formal set up uses skilled worker as specific factor and the other uses unskilled 
labor as the same, with capital moving between them. Here formal workers are organized but not 
the informal workers which mean that the formal sector has to pay minimum wage, but not the 
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informal sector. Informal unskilled workers have to face a competitive market. Therefore, 
unskilled wage in the formal and informal segments are not identical. Whoever does not find a 
job in the formal sector will get one in the informal sector and wage there can have a free fall. 
No one can afford to remain unemployed because they have to survive. Formal workers are 
likely to get higher administered wage than their informal counterpart because of the existence of 
trade unions. 
In this context we need to mention that our work is related to the research area dealing with 
economics of corruption. Marcoullier and Young (1995) has developed a two sector model on 
graft and corruption demonstrating tacit political support for informal sector. But they do not 
model extortion in a general equilibrium framework. Similarly Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007) 
brings in informal sector and corrupt bureaucrats but they do not constitute labor mobility 
between various informal segments and does not consider a general equilibrium framework. 
The model we develop is in the tradition of more recent work in trade theory on extensions of 
the basic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) set up drawing from an early work of Gruen and 
Corden (1970) and from later contributions of Jones and Marjit (1992, 2008), Marjit and Beladi ( 
1999), Beladi and Marjit (1992), Marjit, Kar and Beladi (2007a) etc. 
It should be noted at the very outset that the extortionists in our model will be intermediaries 
lubricating the activities of the informal sector and have the option of engaging in informal 
production activities as well. Given this set up various reformatory policies may have 
counterintuitive outcomes with unintended expansion of the informal segment. 
The basic results that we derive in this paper are as follows: higher degree of extortion causes 
a squeeze in informal productive activity but informal workers may gain; better quality of 
administration might bring about more informality in the economy; and under reasonable 
condition a tariff reduction may amplify the informal output whereas under the same condition 
informal workers would be worse off in money terms but not in real terms. 
Section 2 discusses the basic model and the equilibrium. Section 3 deals with the impact of a 
change in the degree of extortion, change in the monitoring or auditing probability and tariff cut 
on outputs, informal wage, informal good’s price and the size of extortion sector. The last section 
concludes the paper. The relevant mathematical derivations are provided in the Appendix. 
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2.  The Basic Model and Solutions 
There are three goods X, Y and Z produced in the neo-classical framework using four factors 
such as skilled labor (S), unskilled labor (L) and two types of capital (K and T). Capital is 
perfectly mobile across X and Y but T is specific to Z. S is specific to X and gets Ws as wage. L 
is mobile between Y and Z.  Laborers are unionized in Y. They get   as their wage. K gets 
identical return r across X and Y while T gets R in Z. Who are not fortunate enough to work in 
Y, have to go out of the formal segment. Because of their livelihood they need to find out 
alternative workplace. This is provided by the production of Z. However, Z can not be produced 
by these two factors only. It requires the service of another factor that actually negotiates 
between producers and administrators since Z is not permitted to be produced legally. But if Z is 
never produced some labor must remain unemployed and they will not survive. Therefore Z is a 
necessary for a perfectly competitive full employment framework. Nonetheless, producers of Z 
need to comply with some institutional and political menace as it is an extra-legal, if not illegal, 
activity. To combat such menace producers obtain service of intermediaries who actually watch 
out for these institutional perils. Intermediaries are unproductive in that no additional output is 
produced by them. Their marginal productivities in terms of the volume of goods are zero though 
they get positive return for their work. However, without such an arrangement production of Z 
could not have taken place. We call this sector Z as an informal sector. 
Intermediation is done only by labor. People engaged in intermediation activities get 
pecuniary benefit without producing goods. Let LN be the people and N be the sector 
representing intermediations. Important to note that the return to intermediators,   must be 
greater than competitive informal wage, W.  The difference between PZ  and sum of the returns to 
productive factors in Z goes to extortionists as a payment for intermediation activities. N people 
also need to take care of the police personnel who are supposed to go for evicting these informal 
production units as these are illegal from government’s perspective. Let the probability of being 
caught in act is q and under this condition intermediators need to pay b fraction of WN as bribe. 
After paying out for the police the return to LN must be equal to W since labor is mobile between 
Z and N. Here it is worth mentioning that LN people always receive WN as return it does not 
matter whether administration can identify the informal units or not. Thus here both, a part of 
administration and N people are involved in corrupt practices.  N people pay bribe to police not 
only for the informal production units but also for their own existence. If there are no informal 
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activities the return to N people goes down to zero. And on the other hand whether Z survives or 
not that crucially depends on how many people are involved in extortion activities or how much 
is paid for these extortionists. Say α  is the fraction of output that is lost due to these 
political/institutional complications related intermediations. Thus we can coin this sort of 
intermediations as directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (Bhagwati, 1982). This is the 
concept of corruption that we are going to use in our model. In an earlier but a different paper 
Mandal and Marjit (2010) used the similar notion of corruption to explain the wage distribution 
between skilled and unskilled. 
We have a small open economy with competitive markets for production as well as for 
extortions related intermediation or corruption. Competitive corruption market implies that the 
lost output due to intermediation is fully exhausted in paying out extortionists out of which a part 
(may be fixed or variable) goes to police. Moreover, we have the standard neo-classical 
assumptions of constant returns to scale and diminishing return to factors. The following set of 
equations describes the model and the interpretations of symbols are usual and well used in trade 
models (Jones, 1965, 1971). Let the prices of X and Y be normalized to unity. Y is the 
importable commodity and subject to a tariff t. 
The competitive price conditions are given by: 
   	 
  1                          (1)                                       
   	 
  1                           (2) 
      1                                           (3)  
Note that,  [ ]1,0∈α ; a low α will mean lower degree of extortion and conversely.  
Note that, the production function for Z is represented by  
   ,           (4) 
The expected wage for intermediators satisfies the following equation  
1    1           (5) 
Or, 1      
Note that, this equality is established because of labor mobility between informal production 
and extortion segments. This has to hold true. If the LHS (RHS) of equation-5 becomes greater 
than RHS (LHS) everyone would try to be involved in extortion (production) related activities 
and would result in non-feasibility of both the informal segments. The reason is the 
complementarity between extortionists and productive workers in the informal sector. And 
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equation-5 further makes informal workers, essentially, indifferent between extortion and 
production.  
Therefore,    ! " Where 0 $  $ 1  and 0 %  % 1   (6) 
Equation (6) always ensures that   &  except the extreme case where   0. Note that 
 &  & . 
The value of output lost in Z must be identical to the payment made for extortionists. Thus, 
.  .            (7) 
Plugging (6) into (7) one gets, 
(.)*.,*
+ 

 ! "        (8)   
Full employment of all the factors guarantee the following equations, 
 . ,  -          (9) 

 . ,  
 . .  /          (10) 
 .             (11) 
. .   .             (12) 
Let us further assume that the demand for Z follows standard Cobb-Douglas preference 
where 0 fraction of consumers’ income is spent on the informal good. Therefore demand supply 
equilibrium in the informal sector implies, 
01,  1   .2  1  0.        (13)  
 
This completes the structure of the model. Now let us solve for the unknown variables. Note 
that , ,  , /, ,  and - are exogenously given and we need to solve for 
, , 	, , , ,, .,  and  to solve for from equation (1) - (3) and (8) – (13). We have nine 
equations and nine unknown variables. Thus the system is solvable. Given the tariff rate, t we 
solve for r from (2) as   is exogenously determined by workers’ union. Equation (1) would 
determine Ws for already determined r. Thus  , 
, 67 
 are determined through CRS 
assumption. Hence (9) give us the value of X and given this value of X we can solve for Y from 
(10) as endowment of S and K are constants. However,  , ,  ,  and  are still to be 
determined. 
  
Substituting from (9) equation (12) can be rewritten as 
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      89:8;: </ 
8;=
8>= -?       (14) 
Given the commodity prices we already know the values of , 
 , 
 ,    and L, K and 
S are given. Thus RHS of (14) is constant for these given values. This implies a negative 
relationship between  and  for equation (14) to be satisfied. 
Again equation (8) can also be represented as follows, 
(.,*
+ 

)* .

 ! "        (15)  
 
Here )* is the real wage of informal workers;  and   are given. Following an increase in 
 the RHS of (15) would fall as the marginal productivity of Lz falls. And simultaneously the 
numerator of the LHS must go up as the supply of variable factor increases. Thus to bring back 
the equality in (15)  has to increase. Therefore,  and  are positively related following 
equation (15).  
Hence we can represent equation (14) and (15) in   and  plane to determine the 
equilibrium values of   and   in our set up. Let us portray it in figure-1. 
 
           Lz 
         A      D   Equation (15)  
 
         @              E  
 
          C          B   Equation (14)  
    
O    @      LN 
Figure –1 
Determination of equilibrium  and . 
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Now given the equilibrium values of  @   and  @  we can easily calculate the value of Z from 
(15) as all the remaining variables are given. In fact, the equilibrium value of LN can also be 
calculated for any given value of Lz .  
Once Z is determined, Pz is easily solved for from the Cobb-Douglas preference function 
symbolized in (13). From equation (13) it is apparent that given the values of X and Y, the 
demand for Z that comes from the formal sector remains constant. Hence if Pz goes up Z has to 
fall in the RHS of (13), signifying the standard negative relationship for demand. On the other 
hand an increase in Pz must be followed by a rise in the return to informal workers and specific 
factor. The return to specific factor would increase more compared to informal labor (for a 
detailed mathematical derivation see Appendix A). Therefore, producer will try to economize on 
usage of dearer factor,  falls implying a rise in Z. This explains the positive supply side 
relationship between Pz and Z. This is precisely how, from the intersection of demand and 
supply, the equilibrium Pz is determined in this model. Therefore, given the equilibrium value of 
Pz, W is determined from (8). And eventually using Pz and W we can calculate the value of R. 
Thus the entire system is solved. However, it is worth mentioning that once W is determined we 
can easily get the wage rate for extortionist, WN, from equation (6).  
3.  Comparative Static Results 
3.1  An increase in A 
Let us assume that owing to some reasons the degree of extortion goes up in the informal 
sector. It is easily understandable that keeping all other things remaining same an increase in  is 
in fact tantamount to a fall in Pz.Given Pz differentiating equation (3) we get,  
B  C  D C   . E     (16) 
(where Cs bear the usual meaning) 
Note that, X and Y would remain unchanged as B   F   	̂   ̂  0.  
The elasticity of substitution (represented by H ) for Z gives, 
 
I  H . CJB  DK      (17) 
 
The full employment condition of unskilled labor provides (assuming no change in L and Y) 
  I   F   L9+L9*         (18) 
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Substituting  F   from (8) and setting no change in Pz and (1-bq) 
I    L9+L9*  JE   B  B K       (19) 
 
Comparing (17) and (19) 
 
 
JB  DK    L9+L9*ML9+   

N*.O9* JE  B K       (20)  
 
Multiplying both sides of (20) by  C and adding it with (16) yields, 
   
 B <1  ∆N* .
OQ*
O9*?  E R
∆
N* .
OQ*
O9*  S    (21) 
 
Here,  ∆  L9+L9*ML9+  $ 1   and  0 $  $ 1. 
B  E J∆. OQ* T (.  N*.O9*K∆. OQ* M  N*.O9*      (22) 
Hence B  is ambiguous.   
B & 0  
if ∆.  C &  .  H . C  
or, 
∆
(.  N*>
O9*
 OQ* .         (23) 
It is apparent from equation (16) that D has to be negative when B & 0 . Therefore under 
condition (23) JB  DK & 0  and the output of Z must fall following equation (17). 
Manipulating (20) and using (16) one can easily derive the value of D. 
D  . E  ∆N* . E 
∆
N* . E  
J∆. OQ* T (.  N*.O9*K
∆. OQ* M  N*.O9*          (24) 
We have already mentioned that D must be negative. This can only happen if the following 
condition holds good. And it has to hold true from (16). 
U  ∆N*U & U
∆
N* .
J∆. OQ* T (.  N*.O9*K
∆. OQ* M  N*.O9* U           (25) 
However, if the reverse of condition (23) is satisfied there would be a reduction in the informal 
wage due to an increase in the degree of extortion. Thus, 
B $ 0  
if ∆.  C $  .  H . C  
or, 
∆
(.  N* < 
O9*
 OQ* .       (26) 
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Interestingly, under condition (26) D becomes unambiguously negative. At the same time a 
closer investigation of (22) reveals that VB V $ |E|. This implies VDV & VB V. Note that both are 
negative. This argument ensures JB  DK & 0 . This makes  I $ 0. Therefore, it does not matter 
what happens to B  67 D, Z must contract. Contraction of Z is made possible through a 
reduction in Lz and a simultaneous increase in LN. This can be shown diagrammatically as 
follows. 
 
 
Lz          
          
         A      D   Equation (15)  
              
         @                     E  
         ′                  
          C                B   Equation (14)  
                 
O    @  ′     LN 
Figure – 2 
Determination of equilibrium  and  due to an increase in  
 
However, we need to know the effect on Pz to get the upshot on real wage. We already know 
that output of Z contracts consequent upon an increase in the degree of extortion. From the LHS 
of (13) it remains unchanged as there is no expansion or contraction in X and/or Y. But in the 
RHS we have negative effect through a fall in Z. Hence Pz must rise at equilibrium. Nevertheless 
it is not less interesting to see what happens to the real wage. As T is fixed and Lz has gone 
down, marginal productivity of labor should increase in Z. Consequently the real wage should 
also increase. This is possible iff W rises since Pz has already increased. Hence we can rule out 
the leeway of a negative B  (and precisely the condition (26)). The only possibility is an increase 
 Extortion and Informal Sector in a Small Open Economy 
12 
 
in W along with a fall R and Z in tandem. Therefore WN goes up. This indicates an expansion of 
extortion sector which is denoted by WN.LN (=.  . ). 
Thus the following proposition would summarize the outcome. 
Proposition I: An increase in the degree of extortion would be immediately followed by a 
decrease in the size of the informal production sector. However, the size of the extortion sector 
must expand. 
Corollary I.1: If the degree of extortion increases, both the informal workers and extortionist get 
relatively higher return. The exact condition for this to happen is ∆(.  N* &
O9*
 OQ* . However, the 
return to T falls, unambiguously 
3.2 An increase in XY 
An improvement in the quality of administration in a kleptocratic set up is straightway 
reflected by an increase in monitoring /auditing probability of identifying the people who defy 
laws. Here the law breakers are informal units. Therefore a better administration would be 
followed by an increase in .  
Differentiating the price equation of Z, 
B  C  D C   0      (27) 
Just like the previous section output of X and Y would not change as B   F   	̂   ̂  0.  
From the full employment condition of labor and using (8)  
I    L9+L9*  J1  Z   B  B K      (28) 
Comparing (17) and (28) we have, 
B  ∆. !"Z  ∆. OQ* M  N*.O9*      (29) 
Therefore, B  is unambiguously negative as 1  Z $ 0. If that is the case D & 0. This is 
obvious from equation (27). This judgment guarantees JB  DK $ 0 which in turn make sure 
that   I & 0 (from (17)).  Basically this takes place through relocating adjustments of Lz and LN. 
Here Lz increases and LN falls.  
Nonetheless, the clear-cut expression for D is 
D  1  Z ∆N* R1 
∆ 
∆. OQ* M  N*.O9*S    (30)  
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We have already argued that D & 0. This implies an automatic and obvious satisfaction 
of the inequality,  ∆ ∆. OQ* M  N*.O9* $ 1. The effect on Pz is straight and simple. It must decrease as 
supply goes up without changing the demand implying an ambiguity in the real wage of informal 
productive workers. However, an increase in Lz, given T ensures the fall in real wage of 
informal laborers. But what happens to the money or real wage of extortionists that is not yet 
clear. From equation-(6) we get, 
F  B  1  Z        (31) 
In the RHS, W has already fallen and 1  Z   is also negative. Thus WN would decrease if W 
falls at a rate faster than (1-bq). Accordingly, extortionists are relatively less worse-off than 
informal workers, if they lose at all. Symbolically, 
  F [ 0 iff VB V ^ V1  Z V     (32) 
Therefore, the eventual consequence on the size of extortion sector is also ambiguous. 
  
Thus we propose that, 
Proposition II: Stringent administration or an increase in monitoring probability would end up 
with an expansion of so-called illegal informal productive counterpart of the economy. 
Corollary II.1: Even if the informal production activities increase, the informal workers lose 
unambiguously consequent upon the qualitative improvement of administration.  
3.3 A reduction in t 
To start with assume that the government has initiated the liberalization strategy and 
accordingly opted for a tariff cut in the importable sector. Setting B  0,  we derive  
 	̂   ̂. _O;: $ 0              ;  (as ̂ $ 0   (33) 
  F   O;=O>= .
_
O;: . ̂ & 0       ; (as ̂ $ 0   (34) 
And setting E   F  0   equation (16) would be modified as follows 
  B  C  D C  0       (35) 
Applying the elasticity of substitution in X and Y sector we obtain, 
  ,D  H. O;=O>= .
_
O;: . ̂   & 0 ; as ̂ $ 0.   (36) 
  .D  H. O;=O>= .
L;=
L;: .
_
O;: . ̂  $ 0 ; as ̂ $ 0.   (37) 
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These results are quite obvious as both X and Y share same mobile capital, K. As Y shrinks 
some unskilled labor would be released. They would immediately rush to the informal fragment. 
Therefore, informal activity must expand. Note that informal activity consists of both production 
and extortion activities. This implies an increase in (LN+LZ). Thus whether output of Z would 
spread out that depends on as to where these relinquished labors get employed: in production 
(Lz) or in extortion related intermediation (LN) or in both. Thus the interesting question is what 
happens to LN and Lz separately.  
From equation (14) the RHS must increase as labor employed in Y dwindles and 
simultaneously the LHS has to go up. This is portrayed in figure-3. It is evident from the diagram 
that Lz will increase coupled with an increase in LN as well. Hence output of Z should rise as T 
remains fixed at an exogenously given level. 
 
 Lz 
             A’     
         A      D   Equation (15)  
   ′            
         @              E  
                 B’    
          C              B   Equation (14)  
   O    @  ′     LN 
Figure – 3 
Determination of equilibrium  and  due to a fall in t  
 
 
Nevertheless there are some other real possibilities regarding  and .  Keep Lz fixed by 
assumption. This will ensure an increase in LN. In figure-3 CD has to shift right along with an 
upward shift of AB. Thus the point is, as a consequence of such assumption how much likely 
that Lz will remain unchanged. Lz would remain unchanged if “in equilibrium” Z remains 
unaltered as T is exogenously fixed. From the Cobb-Douglas preference it is apparent that (a) as 
Y falls demand for Z should fall; (b) as X increases demand for Z should rise and (c) demand for 
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Z also rises because of an increase in LN (note that to start with Lz is kept frozen). “In 
equilibrium” if (a) is offset by the (b) and (c), informal production does not change and hence an 
unchanged Lz. This insures an unconditional expansion of LN or extortion activity as informal 
labor has already risen. This would be obvious from equation (44) with an equality sign. 
However, if (a) is strong enough Lz must fall and +* must rise. On the other hand if positive 
demand effect is sufficiently strong both LN and LZ are likely to expand. This is the situation that 
have been shown in figure-3. Therefore it is more likely that LN or extortion activity may 
increase due to a tariff cut. 
 
Now let us go back to the analysis where we have focused on a simultaneous increase in Lz 
and LN. Manipulating the unskilled labor constraint and plugging (37) into it and setting D  0 
one obtains 
   I    RF. L9+L9*   ` . ̂S     (38) 
Where,`  L9:L9* . H.
O;=
O>= .
L;=
L;: .
_
O;: . ̂ 
It has already been discussed that both F   and I  would be positive due to a tariff slash.1 
Therefore to make I & 0 the following condition needs to be satisfied, 
aF. bb   `. ̂c $ 0 
     
|`. ̂| & UF. L9+L9*U   (39) 
Comparing (38) and (17) 
H . CJB  DK  aF. bb   `. ̂c 
   Or,  JB  DK  RF. L9+L9*   ` . ̂S

N*.O9*  (40) 
 
Multiplying both sides of (40) by  C and adding it with (35) yields, 
B  RF. L9+L9*   ` . ̂S
OQ*
N*.O9*    (41) 
Hence informal wage, W, would fall after liberalization if and only if Z expands, i.e. when 
RF. L9+L9*   ` . ̂S $ 0. And subsequently the wage to extortionists will also decrease. The 
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absolute number of extortionist, LN, must increase. However, what happens to the size of the 
extortion sector (= that is unclear as though LN rises unambiguously the effect on WN is 
not unconditional. 
Economic argument behind this outcome is very easy to follow. Due to liberalization as the 
output of Y shrinks the supply of unskilled labor increases in the informal sector. This is likely to 
depress W as the supply of complementary factor, T is fixed. However, Z must go up.  
Still, what happens to the informal price consequent upon a tariff cut that is not very 
undemanding as liberalization conventionally raises the formal income2. This increased income 
induces higher demand for informal good whose supply has already been raised. In what follows 
the eventual impact on Pz relies on the relative strength of these two effects.   
Differentiating and manipulating equation (13) we get, 
F  -H O;=O>=
_
O;: ̂  -H
O;=
O>=
L;=
L;:
_
O;: 1  ̂  RF
L9+
L9*   ` ̂S  ̂   (42) 
    Where, -  d. d.)*. and - 
d.
 d.)*. 
Equation (42) confirms that F $ 0 iff R:=
L;=
L;: 1  S & 1.     (43) 
Therefore if the share of expenditure on Z coming from Y is not sufficiently less the above 
inequality is likely to hold true. And hence informal price would fall due to a tariff cut.  
In fact Pz may even fall under the following condition, 
U-H O;=O>=
L;=
L;:
_
O;: 1    RF
L9+
L9*   `S   U>U-H
O;=
O>=
_
O;:U    (44) 
Plugging (41) into (42) we have, 
F  -H O;=O>=
_
O;: ̂  -H
O;=
O>=
L;=
L;:
_
O;: 1  ̂  B
N*.O9*
OQ*  ̂    (45)  
Thus if Z expands and equation (43) is satisfied Pz is likely to fall more than that of W 
entailing an increase in real wage. If the reverse of (44) is true Pz will increase. But that is 
unlikely since the skilled sector is not expected to spend a sufficiently large share on the informal 
good (high SY relative to Sx). 
 
Therefore the following proposition is immediate. 
 Proposition III: Liberalization may not necessarily increase informal production. Under some 
reasonable condition informal production will get the boost. 
Proof: For detailed mathematical calculations refer to appendix B. 
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Corollary III.1: The informal workers would be worse off in money wage under the same 
condition for which informal output increases. But the real wage may well go up.  
 
 4. Conclusion   
In this paper our endeavor is to propose an apt extension of HOS framework where both 
formal and informal sectors work in tandem. Formal goods are produced in the fair segment of 
the economy while informal sector is affected by extortion. But informal good is never 
unwarranted. Under these circumstances an increase in the degree of extortion definitely 
contracts the informal productive segment while the size of the extortion sector must expand. On 
the other hand if the administrative people ask for larger pie of the unsolicited cake, the informal 
activity increases. Nevertheless the effect of liberalization is ambiguous. However, informal 
workers would be better off in terms of real wage under liberalization if informal sector inflates.   
 
Footnote 
1. One can easily follow the steps for F  as in previous sections. This is provided in Appendix C. We retained 
F  in order to avoid nagging cumbersome calculations since the intuition behind F  is crystal clear.   
2. One special case under this situation could be the unchanged income from X and Y. It is very much 
possible as X goes up and Y falls. 
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APPENDIX  A 
Given all other variables except Pz, differentiating equation (3) and using the standard 
notations for general equilibrium trade model we get,  
B  C  D C    F1        (A.1) 
Note that, nothing would happen to X and Y as B   F   	̂   ̂  0.  
Mathematically, using the elasticity of substitution for Z one gets, 
I  H . CJB  DK        (A.2) 
Again from the full employment condition of unskilled labor and assuming no change in L and Y 
  I   F   L9+L9*           (A.3) 
Substituting  F   from (8) 
I    L9+L9*  J F   B  B K         (A.4) 
Comparing (A.2) and (A.4) 
 
JB  DK    L9+L9*ML9+   

N*.O9* J F  B K         (A.5)  
Multiplying both sides of (A.5) by  C and adding it with (A.1) yields,  
 B <1  ∆N* .
OQ*
O9*?   F R1   
∆
N* .
OQ*
O9*S     (A.6) 
Here,  ∆  L9+L9*ML9+      and  0 $  $ 1. 
Hence B  is unambiguously positive if  F & 0. 
Manipulating (A.6) 
B   F R1  (.N*.O9*N*.O9*M∆.OQ*S       (A.7) 
The RHS is definitely positive. Because, 
B   F aH . C  ∆. C  . H . CH. C  ∆. C c   
F aH . C1    ∆. CH. C  ∆. C c 
As 0 $  $ 1, B & 0 due to an increase in Pz. 
 A positive B  also implies H . C  ∆. C &  . H . C. 
Equation (A.7) asserts that, 
JB   FK   F < (.N*.O9*N*.O9*M∆.OQ*?      (A.8) 
Therefore, for  F & 0, JB   FK $ 0  Or,  B $  F       (A.9) 
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Equation (A.9) coupled with the argument of (A.1) ensures a positive D and D & B . This is 
evident from (A.5) as B $  F  . Therefore, JB  DK $ 0 which indicates a positive I  due to an 
increase in Pz through equation (A.2). 
 
APPENDIX  B 
Using a circumflex over a variable to represent proportional change,  
From (1), (2) and (3) we have, 
F C  	̂C
  0          (B.1) 
B  C  	̂ C
   ̂.           (B.2) 
B  C  D C  1  . F  . E       (B.3)  
From full employment conditions one can arrive at, 
,D  -I  e              (B.4) 
,.B b
  .D. b
  /B           (B.5) 
I  D  e               (B.6) 
..B b  I. b  D  F. b         (B.7) 
Again from equation (13) one gets, 
0. ,. ,D+0. . f.D  J.D  ̂Kg  11  0 . 2JI  FK      (B.8) 
On the other hand, equation (7) can also be delineated in the following form with 
proportional changes.  
E  F  I  F  B  1  Z          (B.9) 
From (B.6) we get 
I  H . CJB  DK          (B.10) 
Where H  8Q*e   89*eB  hD , representing the elasticity of substitution in Z and C is the distributive 
share of factor(s). 
Again from (B.7) we have, 
I   F   L9+L9*   ..B  
L9:
L9*           (B.11) 
Comparing (B.10) and (B.11) 
  
JB  DK   F   L9+L9*  

N*.O9*  ..B  
L9:
L9*  

N*.O9*       (B.12) 
 Extortion and Informal Sector in a Small Open Economy 
20 
 
Then manipulating (B.12) and using (B.3) one can easily deduce the value of  B , F . On the 
other hand using the equation of change from (B.8) and then comparing it with (B.10) or (B.11) 
we can have the equilibrium value of Pz. 
From equation (B.8) and (B.11) 
F  -H O;=O>=
_
O;: ̂  -H
O;=
O>=
L;=
L;:
_
O;: 1  ̂  I  ̂    
i	, F  -H O;=O>=
_
O;: ̂  -H
O;=
O>=
L;=
L;:
_
O;: 1  ̂  < F   
L9+
L9*   ..B
L9:
L9*  ?  ̂  
i	,  F  -H O;=O>=
_
O;: ̂  -H
O;=
O>=
L;=
L;:
_
O;: 1  ̂  RF
L9+
L9*   ` ̂S  ̂              (B.13) 
Where, -  d. d.)*. and - 
d.
 d.)*. and  `  
L9:
L9* . H.
O;=
O>= .
L;=
L;: .
_
O;: . ̂ 
 
APPENDIX  C 
Following a reduction in t, from price equations 
	̂   ̂. _O;: $ 0         (C.1) 
  F   O;=O>= .
_
O;: . ̂ & 0        (C.2) 
And setting E   F  0   in the price equation of Z we get, 
  B  C  D C  0         (C.3) 
Using the elasticity of substitution for Z one gets, 
I  H . CJB  DK        (C.4) 
Applying the elasticity of substitution in X and Y sector we obtain, 
  ,D  H. O;=O>= .
_
O;: . ̂   & 0 ; as ̂ $ 0.     (C.5) 
  .D  H. O;=O>= .
L;=
L;: .
_
O;: . ̂  $ 0 ; as ̂ $ 0.     (C.6) 
From the full employment condition of L and plugging   F  J I  B K from (8) and .D  from the 
previous equation 
 I   R L9+L9*  B 
L9+
L9*  H . CJB  DK  b. H.
O;=
O>= .
L;=
L;: .
_
O;: . ̂S       (C.7) 
Comparing (C.4) and (C.7) and manipulating a bit  
JB  DK    L9*ML9+  Rb. b . H.
O;=
O>= .
L;=
L;: .
_
O;: . ̂  b. B S     (C.8) 
Judiciously using (C.3) and (C.8) yields 
B  L9*.L9:.N=.
j;=
j>= .
k;=
k;: .
l
j;:._I.
∆.jQ*
k9+
M∆.OQ*          (C.9) 
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where,  ∆  L9+L9*ML9+  . 
It is evident from (C.9) that B $ 0 as ̂ $ 0. Therefore D must be positive from equation 
(C.3). Hence JB  DK $ 0. This inequality guarantees a positive I . This is the same thing that 
we got in the main text. Furthermore, this also ensures  F  JI  B K & 0. 
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